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errors and omissions. “To the slave cultivators of ancient times, gradually succeeded a species of farmers
know at present in France by the name of Metayers.” “It could never, however, be to
the interest even of this last species of cultivators to lay out, in further improvement
of the land, any part of the little stock which they might save from their own share of
the produce, because the lord, who laid out nothing, was to get one-half of whatever
is produced.” (Adam Smith, 1776, vol. I, pp. 412 and 414)
“With a short-term lease (sharecropping) renters are obviously aware that landlords
have the alternative of renting their land fora cash rentindependent of current output.
Consequently, the tenant must plan to produce an average output per acre that will
provide a rental payment, if yields are average, equal to the possible cash rent plus
any additional payment required to compensate the landlord for the uncertainty that
he bears.” “Once he has found a farm, he may fear that his lease will not be renewed
unless su¢cient rent is actually paid.” (D. Gale Johnson, 1950, pp. I 20)
Insurance is the term used to describe formal and informal arrangements aimed
at dealing with the risk of harmful events. Risk has been a main concern of the
human race since early times and many practices in primitive tribes can be seen as
insurance mechanisms. This essay is intended to survey somerecent empirical works
about sharecropping—a very old type of insurance used to share the risk posed by
nature on agricultural activities.
Sharecropping (or Metayer System) is a form of land leasing in which a tenant
and a landlord share the output of a farm as compensation for the managerial
1labor supplied by the former and the land capital supplied by the latter. This
type of leasing has been used since ancient times and is still important in modern
economies.1 Astheinitial quotessuggest, thedebateabout sharecropping isclassical
and still active in modern economics.
Agriculturehasbeenseenasamajorelement ineconomicthought sincethePhys-
iocrats. However, Adam Smith was the …rst classical author to explicitly comment
on the sharecropping practice. In the …rst volume of the Wealth of Nations (Book
II, Chapter II), Smith discussed the discouragement of agriculture and strongly
stresses the lack of incentives inherent to the metayer system. Sharecroppers bear
alone most of the input costs (especially labor costs) and receive only fraction of
the …nal output. As a consequence, they would tend to undersupply these inputs.
Furthermore, they face high tenure uncertainty, which reduces their incentives to
promote land improvements.
Based on similar arguments, many other classical authors condemned this type
of lease. John Stuart Mill (1848) wrote: “The metayer has less motive to exertion
than the peasant proprietor, since only half the fruits of his industry, instead of a
whole, are his own.”2 The fact that di¤erent generations of the same family live as
tenants on some lands is also mentioned as able to reduce the problems caused by
tenure uncertainty.3 Alfred Marshall (1890) shared the view of previous authors.
He wrote: “For, when the cultivator has to give to his landlord half of the returns
to each dose of capital and labor that he applies to the land, it will not be to his
interest to apply any doses the total return to which is less than twice enough to
reward him.”4 Karl Marx (1894) condemned sharecropping, considering it a feudal
institution incompatible with capitalism.5
In spiteofthe apparent consensus among the classical economists against share-
cropping, this type of lease remained in use throughout the Old World and became
even more popular in the New World. Intriguing, share contracts in the 20th cen-
1Hodkinson (1992) comments on the sharecropping practice in ancient Greece. Ho¤man (1984)
mentions a dramatic expansion of sharecropping in France between the Middle Ages and the 17th
century. He suggests that most French historians blame it for increasing social strati…cation and
poverty in the countryside. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) present an analysis of the risk-sharing
properties of sharecropping in early Renaissance Tuscany.
2Mill (1848), Book II, Chapter VIII, pp. 304.
3Mill also mentions the very critical view of the English writers (Arthur Young, Mr. M’Culloch,
Mr. Jones, Turgot, and Destutt-Tracy), and acknowledges the view of M. de Sismondi (a landowner
from Tuscany) defending the metayer system for protecting tenants from land disputes with their
neighbors—such disputes would be part of the landlord’s responsibilities.
4Marshall (1980), Book VI, Chapter IX, pp. 644.
5This is a curious point. In fact, the idea of a noble landlord leasing lands to poor farmers in
order to avoid being involved in productive actives does not seem to …t in a dynamic capitalist
system. However, the idea of an absentee shareholder hiring a manager to run a company turned
out to be a main characteristic of modern capitalism.
2tury tended to have short duration, contrary to the classical arguments for tenure
stability. Noticing this fact, D. Gale Johnson (1950) stressed that by granting
short-term leases, the landlord keeps the possibility of using renovation threats as
an extra source of incentives. Moving is costly for tenants, and landlords tend to
renew contracts based on relative performance (i.e., by comparing the productivity
of sharecropped farms with thoseofsimilar lands owned or leased under …xed rent).
Hence, this repeated feature of tenancy contracts should induce sharecropping ten-
ants to supply the appropriate amount of labor and other inputs. Moreover, the
landlord should bewilling to pay for land-speci…c investments, which alter thelong-
term productivity ofthe land and, therefore, its rental price. Under these premises,
sharecropping generates no loss of e¢ciency in resource allocation.
Modern Theory
From Adam Smith to D. Gale Johnson, the debate was mainly concentrated
on the sharecropping incentives for proper allocation of resources. Cheung (1969)
shifted thefocusof thediscussiontowards theinsurancepropertiesofsharecropping.
He argued that e¢cient resource allocation would be obtained whenever landlords
were able to monitor tenants’ activities. Under this premise, sharecropping is pre-
sented as an e¢cient way of sharing the production risk between landlords and
tenants. In equilibrium, the share of risk borne by landlords and tenants would be
determined by the di¤erence in their level of risk aversion.
In 1974, Joseph E. Stiglitz published a distinguished analysis of the sharecrop-
ping problem. Share contracts were viewed as an optimal solution for an insurance
problem in a scenario with moral hazard. Tenants usually chooseprivately observed
variables that a¤ect productivity, and the optimal share rate should balance the
incentives forexerting thesehidden actions and the costs of risk bearing. The works
by Stiglitz (1974), Holmstrom (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), among others, showed that the optimal tenancy contract should
not provide full incentives for tenants in environments with moral hazard. Similar
to the predictions of Adam Smith and other classical authors, sharecropping would
in fact not inducethemaximum output per unit ofland. However, this productivity
loss would be compensated by the welfare gains of sharing risk.
By connecting the early discussion about resource allocation with Cheung’s
analysis of optimal contract design, the literature on moral hazard set the basis
for our modern understanding of tenancy contracts. This literature together with
the works on asymmetric information developed by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973),
and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) became the core of modern insurance theory.
Insurance, however, is not the only motive raised in the literature to explain
the design of tenancy contracts. Rao (1971) and Prendergast (2002) argue that the
value ofmanagerial e¤ort and entrepreneurial activitiesis much higherin risky envi-
3ronments. Gainsassociated with delegation ofdecision-making powerare increasing
with risk and, thus, risky farms would berented under contracts with high incentive
power (i.e., contracts in which a high shareofthe output is retained by the tenant).
This prediction is in sharp contrast with those based on insurance. In a di¤erent
vein, papers on transaction costs list a number of di¤erent features that can a¤ect
thecontract choice. For instance, costs formeasuring the…nal output tend to disen-
couragesharecontracts(seeAllenandLueck, 1992). Also, negotiationsto determine
the rental price in a …xed-rent contract can destroy trust between the parties since,
usually, landlords have betterinformation about theland (see Williamson, 1979 and
Murrell, 1983).
New aspects of the agency problem have been pointed out recently. Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985) discuss a situation in which the landlord also exerts productive
activities. In this scenario, sharecropping would not only share the risk between
the two parties, but also provide incentives for both of them. La¤ont and Ma-
toussi (1995) stress that, when dealing with a poor and credit-constrained tenant,
sharing the output might be the only way a landlord has to extract the tenant’s
surplus. Prizes based on relative performance were studied by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Green and Stokey (1983). Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985) show
that the optimal …nite-horizon dynamic contract is history dependent and provides
intertemporal insurance for the agents, but also imposes some risk on them within
each period, similarly to Holmstrom (1979). Furthermore, in…nite-horizon versions
of the moral hazard model were shown to be able to replicate the arguments for
…rst-best e¢ciency of sharecropping. Rubinstein and Yaari (1983), Radner (1981,
1985), Spear and Srivastava (1987), among others, study the in…nitely repeated ver-
sion of the principal-agent relationship and show that the …rst-best solution would
be approximately achievable.
All these theoretical advances have raised the sophistication level of the debate
about sharecropping, making empirical investigation even more crucial to test the
relevance of each di¤erent argument. Recently, the availability of well-built data-
bases as well as the development of new identi…cation strategies have brought some
light to the debate. This essay discusses some of these recent contributions without
intending to be representative of the entire literature (which is probably an impos-
sible task). Other complementary surveys are found in Binswanger, Deininger, and
Feder (1995) and Deininger and Feder (1997).
Theremainder ofthiswork isorganized as follows. Section1 discussestheempir-
ical research on resource allocation. This section is divided in two subsections: one
studying the e¤ects of tenure stability on land improvements, and another compar-
ing the impact of di¤erent share rates on input use and farm productivity. Section
2 surveys works testing di¤erent arguments raised to explain the design of tenancy
contracts. The essay then concludes with a brief summary discussing some impor-
4tant policy implications.
1 Resource Allocation
Thetwomainfeatures oftenancy contracts aretenurestatus and incentivepower
(i.e., the share of the …nal output received by the tenant). Since sharecropping and
…xed-rent tenants face tenure uncertainty, fear of expropriation would lead them to
makesuboptimal levels of long-run investments. However, these investments should
be promoted by landlords, who bene…t from their long-run impacts on the lands
(unless they depend on some unobserved action exerted by the tenant, such as land
care). The …rst subsection aims to present empirical papers addressing this topic.
Incentive power, on the other hand, would have systematic impacts on land
productivity and input use. Share contracts display lower incentive power than
ownership and …xed-rent contracts. In the absence of other incentives (such as
renovation threats), farmers under share contracts would use a lower amount of
each noncontractible input (whose costs are not shared by the landlord) and, thus,
their farms would be less productive. Subsection 1.2 addresses this issue.
1.1 Tenure Status
The review here begins with the paper by Besley (1995), which studies the re-
lation between land-speci…c investments and property rights in Ghana. The results
support the hypothesis that land rights and investments are positively correlated.
This …nding is indirectly related to tenure status, since like better-de…ned property
rights, tenure stability avoids expropriation of long-run investments. The second
paper discussed, Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), uses a very unique quasi-
experiment to study the e¤ect of land tenure on resource allocation. This is a very
special paper that links tenure status to incentive power (thus also related to the
topic of the next subsection). The authors use an exogenous change in property
rights in West Bengal that increased tenure stability of tenants and, subsequently,
increased the incentive power of tenancy contracts and land productivity. Next, Ja-
coby andMansuri (2002) suggest that, in Pakistan, ownedlandstend to receivemore
speci…c investments than leased lands; and Bandiera (2002) shows that Nicaraguan
farmers are more likely to grow trees in combination with annual crops in their
owned lands (as opposed to leased lands).
Besley, J.P.E., 1995
Thiswork examinesthecorrelationbetweeninvestment andland rightsinGhana.
The author list three possible channels driving this correlation. First, land rights
would a¤ect investments through fear of expropriation. Also, better-de…ned land
5rightsmay facilitatelandbeingcollateralized, reducinginterest ratesfacedbylandown-
ers and, then, increasing land investments. Finally, there is a link between invest-
ment and land rights through gains from trade. Superior land rights increase the
extent of the land market for selling and renting. This ampli…es the e¤ects of new
investments on the lands’ prices and rents, increasing the incentives to invest.
The empirical analysis is based on farm-level data from two regions of Ghana,
namely Wassa and Anloga. The main product grown in Wassa is cocoa and the only
signi…cant investment made to improve the land is planting tree crops. In Anloga,
most agriculture is devoted to growing shallots (a type of small green onion) and
land improvements aremuch morediversethan inWassa. Thedatabasecontains: (i)
information on land and household characteristics; (ii) a binary variable indicating
whether land investments were made or not; and (iii) discrete variables describing
household rights on each operated …eld. There is signi…cant variation in property
rights as a consequence of Ghana’s transition from a traditional system (where land
ownership was communal and controlled by a tribal chief) to a moremodern system
that emphasizes individual claims. These rights fall into twelve categories: rights
to sell, rent, gift, mortgage, pledge, and bequeath, each of them with or without
lineage approval. In many parts of thepaper, property rights are aggregated in two
categories: number of rights with and without need for approval.
The author starts by investigating therelationship between investment and land
rights by means of a discrete choice model. Estimations are conducted with and
without household …xed e¤ects.6 A number of variables describing the mode of
acquisition of each farm (purchased, appropriated, gifted, etc.) and the number
of years since the acquisition are used as instrumental variables for property rights.
Theresults for Wassa indicatethat land rightsdo in‡uenceinvestment: betterrights
signi…cantly raise the probability of land investments. The results for Anloga are
less robust, but still broadly in line with the theory.
Extensions attempt to access which of the channels previously listed drive this
relationship. Insuchextensions, theauthormakesuseofthedisaggregatedde…nition
of household rights. First, under the collateral-based argument, di¤erences between
rights that are speci…c to a particular …eld and those that areenjoyed by thefarmer
in all …elds operated. Being allowed to use a particular …eld as collateral does not
necessarily imply that the investments should occur on that speci…c …eld. Thus,
if the relationship between investments and land rights were driven by the e¤ects
of property rights on access to credit markets, investments should be related to
rights enjoyed in all …elds, rather than …eld-speci…c rights. Next, under the gains-
from-trade argument, some land rights (such as the right to sell or rent the …eld)
6Household …xede¤ects account for farmer heterogeneity, but rule out the identi…cation of e¤ects
that depend on the average rights (as in the collateral-based theory).
6should have a greater impact on investments than other rights (such as the right
to mortgage, for instance). The results do not strongly support any of these two
particular theoretical views. In general, the results based on the disaggregated
measures of rights are not as robust as the previous ones.
Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak, J.P.E., 2002
In the late seventies, there was a major change in property rights in West Ben-
gal, India, due to a reform of tenancy laws known as Operation Barga. The reform,
carried out by a newly elected left-wing administration, increased tenants’ bargain-
ing power and secured tenure to the land. The election of this new administration
in West Bengal is interpreted by the authors as a national response to the party in
power, which had ruled India since its independence, rather than a local particular-
ity. Operation Barga is thus interpreted as an exogenous change in property rights
and used to examine the relationship between tenancy laws and e¢ciency.
The paper …rst develops theoretical models for the landlord-tenant relationship,
basedon moral hazard and limited wealth of tenants, which arethen used to analyze
the potential e¤ects of the reform on the contractual relationships. The reform
increased tenants’ reservation utility, sincethey could not beevicted by thelandlord
anymore and they could choose to retain the share of the output accorded before
the reform. Due to limited liability, a higher outside option increases the optimal
sharerate retained by the tenant. The authors bring evidence showing that, in fact,
the incentive power of tenancy contracts has increased after the reform. Greater
tenure security and a higher share rate induce the tenant to increase the supply of
e¤ort and noncontractible land-speci…c investments. On the other hand, after the
reform the landlord loses the possibility of using the threat of eviction as a credible
incentive device.
The e¤ect of Operation Barga on productivity was estimated using two ap-
proaches. The …rst is a quasi-experiment that uses Bangladesh as a control. The
authors argue that Bangladesh may be used as a control because: (i) it did not
introduce tenancy reform; (ii) it is very similar to West Bengal in terms of agro-
climatic conditions, prevalence of tenancy, and agricultural technology; (iii) it had
growth ratessimilarto West Bengal during theperiodbeforethereform. Thesecond
approach compares the productivity growth in districts in which Operation Barga
was implemented intensively to districts in which the program was implemented
less intensively.7 The results from both approaches indicates a positive impact of
Operation Barga on sharecropping productivity.
7Intensity is measured by the number of sharecroppers who registered with the Department of
Land Revenue (a necessary condition for the tenant to be entitled to permanent and inheritable
land tenure).
7Jacoby and Mansuri, Mimeo, 2002
Using data from thePakistan Rural HouseholdSurvey completed in2001, Jacoby
and Mansuri (2002) study whether farmers tend to invest more in their own lands
than in the lands they lease (under sharecropping and …xed rent). Land-speci…c
investment is measured by the amount of farmyard manure (FYM) used per acre
cultivated during the year. The authors argue that: (i) FYM improves land quality
and its e¤ects last for many seasons; (ii) FYM is not portable once incorporated
into the soil; (iii) FYM is usually collected as a byproduct of farmers’ own livestock
and manuring is very labor intensive. Thus, under imperfect monitoring, farmyard
manure could be interpreted a noncontractible land-speci…c investment.
The database contains a subsample of mixed tenants (i.e., households that cul-
tivate owned and leased lands). This feature permits the comparison of investment
behaviors across plots of the same household, avoiding potential biases caused by
unobserved characteristics of the tenant. In addition to this, one must also worry
about selection bias caused by soil-quality heterogeneity. The authors use di¤er-
ences between landholding of the mixed tenant and his landlord in each leased …eld
as an instrument for di¤erences in soil quality. The instrumental variable captures
particular characteristics of the landlord that would be correlated with soil quality
and uncorrelated with unobserved aspects of FYM investments (the dependent vari-
able), asfaraslandlords didnot a¤ect investment decisionsintheirleasedplots. The
results indicate that FYM investments are lower on leased (as opposed to owned)
lands cultivated by the same household, which supports the existence of a holdup
problem.
Bandiera, Mimeo, 2002
Cultivation oftrees in combinationwithregular cropsiscostly, but conserves soil
fertility and reduces soil erosion (a bene…t not fully appropriated by untenured ten-
ants). Bandiera (2002) analyzes the dichotomouschoice of farmerswho may or may
not grow trees, using data from the 1998 Nicaragua Living Standards Measurement
Survey matched with town data from the 1995 Nicaragua Census.
After using the full cross-sectional sample, the author uses information on farm-
erswho own and rent di¤erent plotsinordertocontrol fornon-randomheterogeneity
in household characteristics. Land characteristics are not available. Potential se-
lection bias caused by heterogeneous land quality is addressed through a variable
indicating if a particular owned farm was originally acquired via land reform (rather
than purchaseor inheritance). Owned lands acquired via land reform were originally
leased before the reform, being thus similar to currently leased farms.
The results indicate that owned lands are more likely to have trees together
with annual crops. However, one must be careful when interpreting this evidence.
Trees are probably observable by landlords, and the fact that landlords choose not
8to enforce their cultivation might not be related to tenure.
The author also …nds that the tenant’s wealth is not a signi…cant determinant
of technique choice, which suggests that limited liability and risk sharing are not
crucial aspects of the tree-growing decision.
1.2 Incentive Power
This subsection studies thee¤ects of incentive power on input use and farm pro-
ductivity. It starts with the paper by Rao (1971), which contains an investigation
of the productivity di¤erence between owner-operated and share-rented farms in
India. The results are not conclusive. Owner-operated farms produce more output
per acre, but sharecroppers are moreproductive than ownerswhen farm-size level is
held constant. In another classical work, Shaban (1987) uses data from the Interna-
tional CropsResearch InstituteforSemi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), in India, to study
di¤erences in resource allocation across owned and sharecropped lands cultivated by
the same farmer. He …nds that farmers are more productive and use inputs more
intensively on their own lands, suggesting existence of incentive problems. Next,
La¤ont and Matoussi (1995) theorize that, under limited liability, poor sharecrop-
pers would tend to retain a lower fraction of the output and, thus, exert less e¤ort
and be less productive. They bring evidence from Tunisia con…rming their theory.
The last work presented here, Braido (2003a), suggests that the incentive prob-
lems measured by comparing land productivity and input use across farms under
di¤erent contracts can be biased by land-quality heterogeneity. In situations where
land quality is not randomly distributed across di¤erent contracts, one must be
careful when interpreting di¤erences in input use and output produced per unit of
land. Typically, tenants cultivate lands with lower value, which directly reduces
their productivity as well as the marginal return of investing in each factor. Hence,
the fact that sharecroppers are less productive and employ a lower amount of each
input need not mean the existence of shirking behavior. This paper uses ICRISAT
data to revisit Shaban’s conclusions under this new perspective. The results pose
some questions on the belief that sharecroppers shirk systematically.
An important remark must be made here. Except for La¤ont and Matoussi
(1995), the papers discussed in this subsection do not have data on the tenure
status or the length of di¤erent contracts. An implicit assumption of these papers
is that long-term incentives do not a¤ect short-term productivity.
It is worthstressing that I opted to discuss Banerjee, Gertler, andGhatak (2002)
in Section 1.1, but this paper is also related to incentive power. The productivity
increase that followed the land reform in West Bengal is due to a combination of
two e¤ects: tenure stability and higher incentive power. The reform guaranteed
tenure stability, reducing holdup problems associated with long-run investments. It
9also improved tenants’ bargaining power, which increased theshare rate retained by
tenants due to limited liability.
Rao, J.P.E., 1971 — Part I
An important part of Rao’s paper refers to optimal contract design and, then, it
is left for Section 2. Here, I present another investigation carried in that paper (pp.
588) testing the average productivity di¤erence between owner-operated and share-
rented farms. The work uses farm-level data from the Studies in Economics of Farm
Management, in India. In this part of the paper, the author uses 137 observations
from two di¤erent cropping years, 1957-58 and 1958-59, in ten di¤erent villages
(seven of them in the rice zone and three in the tobacco zone).
The author argues that land quality (measured by imputed values of land re-
sources) and otherinputs arehighly correlated. Hence, heestimates aCobb-Douglas
production function where land quality is the only independent variable (capturing
the joint e¤ect of land quality and other inputs).
Theresultsareambiguous. Output peracreishigherin theowner-operated …elds
than in share-rented farms, but observed land quality explains around 90 percent of
this variation. Moreover, the elasticity coe¢cients indicate the existence of dimin-
ishing marginal productivity among owner-operated plots and constant marginal
productivity under sharecropping. Thus, Rao estimatesthe e¤ect ofthecontract on
the average per acre output at each farm-size level. Unlike before, the productivity
is higherin sharecropped lands than in owner-operated farmsofcorresponding sizes.
Shaban, J.P.E., 1987
This work tests between two theoretical models of sharecropping: the Marshal-
lian approach versus Cheung’s monitoring approach. The Marshallian approach as-
sumes a prohibitively high cost ofmonitoring the tenant’s activities. Non-monitored
farmers tend to useless inputs in their sharecropped lands relatively to their owned
lands. Consequently, this leads to a lower output per acre in sharecropped farms.
Themonitoring approach, on the other hand, theorizes that iflandlords accessed an
e¤ective and inexpensive monitoring technology, they would stipulate all relevant
actions to be followed by tenants. In this scenario, there would be no misallocation
associated with sharecropping.
The empirical investigation uses farm-level data from the ICRISAT’s Village
Level Studies, which contain detailed farming information from eight villages in In-
dia. The database contains a subsample of sharecroppers who simultaneously own
and sharecrop di¤erent …elds, allowing one to control for household heterogeneity.
Shaban compares the average per acre output and per acre inputs in owned and
sharecropped lands of the same household. He claims that higher output and in-
put intensities on owned land would support the Marshallian approach, while equal
10estimates for owned and sharecropped lands would favor Cheung’s monitoring ap-
proach.
The results indicate signi…cant di¤erences between per acre output and input
intensities on owned and sharecropped plots of the same household. Controlling for
variations in irrigation, plot value, and some observed soil characteristics, one …nds
that the output per acreis higherby 16.3 percent on owned relativeto sharecropped
lands ofthe same household. Farmers also use signi…cantly more input on each acre
of their owned farms.
La¤ont and Matoussi, RAND, 1995 — Part I
This paper develops a stylized model of sharecropping with the objective of
explaining contractsobservedinEl Oulja, arural area ofTunisia. They key aspect of
themodel isthepresenceofex ante…nancial constraintsthat limit thetenantsability
to pay up front rents and invest in productive inputs. Thus, …xed-rent contracts,
which induce appropriate levels of e¤ort, might not be feasible for landlords dealing
with poor tenants. In their theory, share contracts have the function of providing
e¤ort incentives and solving …nancial constraints. They show that the share of the
product retained by thetenant, the level of e¤ort exerted, and the output produced
are all decreasing in the tenant’s working capital.
These predictions are tested using data collected with the help of the Tunisian
National Institute of Statistics in 1986 in the rural area of El Oulja, Tunisia. The
empirical part can be divided in two subparts: one studying productivity across
contracts and another investigating the determinants of contract designs. Here I
focus on the productivity discussion, leaving for Section 2 the part on contract
choice.
The database contains information on general characteristics of 100 families (in-
cluding wealth and income) and detailed farming information on each plot operated
by these families (including plot size, type of crop, tenancy status, and production
and input levels). A later data collection was carried out in 1988 but, since the
authors do not seem to trust these more recent data, they are used only to test the
robustness of the results.
The authors estimate a log-linear production function using output per hectare
as the dependent variable and dummy variables for the tenancy contract (…xed rent
orsharecropping), hiredlabor, family labor, and otherinputs(evaluatedperhectare)
as control variables. They acknowledge the fact that the tenancy status is endoge-
nous and attempt to solve potential endogeneity biases by means of instrumental
variables. They claim that thetypes ofcrop (e.g., tomato, potato, melon, vegetable)
are good instruments for the tenancy contract. For that to be true, thetypeofcrop
should be correlated to the tenancy contract and not related to unobserved features
a¤ecting output. TheIV estimates for thecontract-dummies coe¢cients are similar
11(namely, 4.8 for …xed rent and 4.4 for sharecropping—see pp. 391), but statistically
di¤erent from each other. Since the contract-dummies coe¢cients measure the im-
pact of each contract on expected output, this result suggests that sharecroppers
exert less e¤ort than …xed-rent tenants. It is also found that, in sharecropped …elds,
productivity is positively related to the length of the relationship.
Braido, Mimeo, 2003a
Land characteristics vary considerably across farms under di¤erent tenancy sta-
tus. Typically, lands leased out to tenants (under sharecropping or …xed rent) have
lower quality than those cultivated by the owners. Some authors argue that good
lands are cultivated by owners because they display larger scopeforsoil exploitation
(see Allen and Lueck, 1992 and 1993, and Dubois, 2002).
Most oftheliteratureonincentivepowercomparestheamount ofdi¤erent inputs
used and output produced (evaluated per unit of land) across …elds under di¤erent
contracts. However, in the presence of land heterogeneity, comparing quantities
(or values) is not a valid procedure to test existence of incentive problems. It is
usually optimal to use inputs less intensively on lands with lower quality, and this
relationship is not necessarily linear (as assumed by Shaban, 1987) or log-linear
(as assumed by Rao, 1971). Furthermore, many land characteristics are privately
observed and, thus, not available in the databases. Thus, whenever sharecropping
is associated with lower-quality lands, these farms will naturally employ inputs less
intensively and be less productive (even after controlling linearly or log-linearly for
observed land characteristics).
Braido (2003a) acknowledges this fact and accesses ICRISAT’s Village Level
Studies (India) to revisit the incentive-power analysis under this perspective. In




where i indexes the plot in a certain year and season, yi represent the output pro-
ducedperunit ofland; Ai isa productivity factorrelatedto observedand unobserved
land quality; ki represents all inputs used per unit of land; and "i is an error term
accounting for hidden actions (such as managerial e¤ort) and other shocks.
De…ne µi =E
¡p
r exp ("i) j Ii
¢
, where p and r represent (respectively) the prices
for yi and ki, and Ii is the information set available for the farmer cultivating plot
i. Noticethat µi is not constant across plots due to di¤erentiated information about
prices and shocks.
For general production functions, pro…t-maximization conditions establish an





A few important features are worth noticing from (2). First, lower land quality
(Ai) implies lower input use and, thus, lower output per unit of land. Second, even
minor di¤erences in land quality (Ai) may signi…cantly impact productivity (yi),
since this e¤ect is ampli…ed through input choices.
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology and pro…t maximizing behavior, one must
notice that ln(ki) and ln(Ai) would be colinear if and only if µi were constant
across plots (i.e., µi = µ). If besides that the productivity factor Ai were perfectly
observed, then one could ignore inputs when estimating the reduced form of (1).
However, there are reasons for µi to vary across plots and (more seriously) Ai is not
perfectly measured, so that ignoring inputs (ki) introduces a serious problems in the
estimation of (1).
The paper then proceeds in the following manner. First, it tests the e¤ect of
the contract form on productivity when observed land quality and input choices are
used as controls. The results show that the entire productivity gap across contracts
is explained by di¤erences in input use. This could be due to the fact that tenants
shirk in their input choices or that these choices re‡ect land-quality heterogeneity.
One must then test whether input choices were distorted.
If inputs were optimally chosen, the marginal productivity of each factor should
be thesameacrossfarms under di¤erent tenancy contracts, regardlessof the distrib-
ution of land quality. A test procedure isdeveloped by using the fact that, when the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, the marginal productivity is easily measured
by ®
yi
ki. The tests conducted cannot reject the hypothesis that marginal productiv-
ities of labor and nonlabor inputs are constant across plots under ownership, …xed
rent, and sharecropping.
2 Contract Design
This section reviews the debate on the designs of tenancy contracts. The two
main characteristics of tenancy contracts are, again, contract length and incentive
power. The literature however is mainly focused on the latter topic, and Bandiera
(2001) is the only paper discussed here that explicitly addresses the …rst issue.
Regarding incentive power, there are three di¤erent classes of arguments com-
monly used to explain it. First, the agency theory (see Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1987) stresses the trade-o¤ between incentives and risk. Holding agents’ risk aver-
sion constant, high-powered contracts were expected to appear in …elds with lower
exogenous risk. On the other hand, the delegation theory (see Rao, 1971 and Pre-
dengast, 2002) predicts exactly the opposite: since the scope for entrepreneurship
13is higher in high-risk …elds, incentives are also more important in these farms. Fi-
nally, arguments based on transaction costs predict that crops with lower costs for
monitoring e¤ort and for measuring inputs and the …nal output are more likely to
be rented under sharecropping.
The review is presented chronologically. It starts with the part of Rao (1971)
that was purposely omitted in Section 1. Rao …nds a positive association between
farm risk and incentive power, supporting the delegation theory. Next, three pa-
pers on transaction costs are discussed: Ho¤man (1984) suggests that vine plots
are usually rented under sharecropping due to lower costs of monitoring the ten-
ant; Allen and Lueck (1992) stress aspects related to soil exploitation and costs of
measuring the …nal output as important in explaining tenancy contracts; and Allen
and Lueck (1993) associate costs of measuring inputs with share contracts in which
landlords and tenants also share input costs. I then discuss a small part of La¤ont
and Matoussi (1995), showing that incentive power is a¤ected by the tenant’s work-
ing capital but not by the tenant’s wealth, emphasizing the relative importance of
…nancial constraints over insurance motives to explain contract designs. Unlikethis
…nding, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) …nd that the contract power is positively
a¤ected by the tenant’s wealth in Renaissance Tuscany. Dubois (2002) studies how
sharecontractsdynamically balancerisk-sharing, e¤ort incentives, andincentives for
land-quality maintenance. Finally, some recent working papers by Bandiera (2001),
Pandey (2001), and Braido (2003b) are presented.
Rao, J.P.E., 1971 — Part II
Let us discuss now another part of Rao’s (1971) paper, related to contract de-
sign, which was deliberately ignored in Section 1. The argument developed by the
author is based on the idea tenants exert a variety of di¤erent entrepreneurial func-
tions. Fixed-rent contracts permit the tenant to capture the returns associated
with decision making and protect the landlord against possible risk arising from
the production decisions of the tenant. Hence, these contracts should be observed
in environments with high risk and signi…cant scope for entrepreneurship. On the
other hand, in low-risk scenarios, where the scope for entrepreneurial decisions is
restricted, sharecropping arrangements insure tenants against risk.
This theory is tested against data from the Studies in Economics of Farm Man-
agement collected by the Government of India in three di¤erent years, 1957-58,
1958-59, and 1959-60, in seven villages of the rice zone and three of the tobacco
zone. Sharecropping and …xed rent coexist in the villages studied, the …rst being
predominant in therice zoneand thelatter being morecommonin thetobacco zone.
The estimated variance of pro…ts is much higher for the tobacco zone (where …xed
rent is predominant) than for the rice zone (where sharecropping is predominant).
Furthermore, irrigation pattern, variation in rainfall, and variation in prices also
14suggest tobacco as a riskier culture than rice. Hence, scope for entrepreneurship
rather than risk sharing is viewed as the key element explaining the design of share
contracts.
Ho¤man, J. Econ. History, 1984
In this work, the author argues that, due to costs of supervising the tenant,
landlords are more likely to lease distant lands under higher-powered contracts.
Moreover, crops requiring a close landlord are more likely to be rented under lower-
powered contracts. These predictions are tested against historical data from 83
contracts, dated between 1533-1633 in France.
Logit estimations show that distant lands are more likely to be rented under
…xed rent relatively to sharecropping, and to sharecropping relative to wage labor
(con…rming the …rst theoretical prediction). Moreover, vines are more likely to
use wage labor than tenancy and, among the …elds leased, sharecropping is more
common than …xed rent. The author argues that vines require present landlords
regardless of the tenancy contract. Considerable damage could be caused if the
tenant neglected buildings and fences. Moreover, by cutting the vines very short,
one increases return in that season at the cost of reducing productivity thereafter.
Hence, thecost ofmonitoring farmingactivitiesissigni…cantly lower invinesand the
fact that these lands are leased under lower-powered contracts support the second
theoretical prediction.
Allen and Lueck, J. Law & Econ., 1992
Due to tenure uncertainty, tenants have incentives to overuse the land. Share-
cropping alleviates this distortion relative to …xed rent because sharing the output
reduces the tenant’s gains in overusing the land. However, in order to implement
share contracts, the landlord must incur the costs of measuring the …nal output.
This is thebasic trade-o¤ studied by Allen and Lueck (1992). Under thistheory,
sharecropping is expected to occur in environments with high possibilities for soil
exploitation and where the cost of dividing the output is low. The authors test this
prediction using a sample with 3,432 leasing contracts from the 1986 Nebraska and
Sough Dakota Leasing Survey. Measurement costs are proxied by the type of crop
cultivated. Hay crops are more di¢cult to measure, since they are typically sold
through private sales in contrast to other cultures that are publicly sold at local
elevators. Scope for soil exploitation is measured by proximity to urban areas and
presence of irrigation. Proximity to urban areas provides alternative uses for the
land, making concerns about soil exploitation less important. Irrigation makes soil
exploitation less likely. Thus, proximity to urban areas and irrigation should be
positively correlated to …xed rent.
A logit analysis is conducted and the results support the underlying theory. In
15addition, theauthors …nd that sharecropping ispositively related to corn and wheat.
Since corn is a crop with high pro…t variability and wheat is a low-risk culture, the
authorarguesthat thisevidencedoesnot support therisk-sharingmotivescommonly
associated with sharecropping.
Allen and Lueck, RAND, 1993
Here, the analysis of the previous paper is extended to understand not only the
sharerateused to divide output, but also the shareof input costsborneby the land-
lord. Agricultural production depends on land and productive inputs. Assuming a
production function that is separablein each factor, …xed rent induces proper useof
inputs. However, since the opportunity cost of using the land is typically lower for
untenured tenants as opposed to owners, …xed-rent contracts induce land overuse.
Sharecropping, on the other hand, alleviates the incentives for land overuse, but
implies costs of measuring the output. Share contracts also distort incentives for
proper use of other inputs, but this could be solved by sharing input costs between
landlords and tenants at the same rate used to share the output.
In this setup, one should expect sharecropping to be associated with lower costs
of measuring output and high possibilities for soil exploitation. Moreover, for easily
measured inputs, sharecropping landlords would share costs at a rate equal to the
crop-share rate. Finally, …xed-rent contracts would beassociated with environments
with few possibilities for soil exploitation and high measurement costs.
These predictions are tested using data from the 1986 Nebraska and South
Dakota Land Leasing Survey. Evidence shows that, in general, tenants either bear
input costs alone or share them with the landlord at the same rate as the output
share. Tenants retain a higher share ofthe output when they bear input costs alone.
Moreover, logit estimates show that inputs purchased in the market are more
likely to beshared than thoseprovided by thefarmer(i.e., those harder to measure).
The probability of having an input being shared is negatively a¤ected by the land’s
value, which proxies for scope of soil exploitation, and by the fraction of the total
area cropped under the current contract—the more lands from the same landlord,
the lower the tenant’s ability to shirk on the use of shared inputs.
La¤ont and Matoussi, RAND, 1995 — Part II
This paperhasmultipleaims, some ofthem already discussedin Section 1. Here,
I focus on a small part of it (pp. 395-397), which uses a ordered probit model to
study the selection of contracts. Evidence from El Oulja, in Tunisia, shows that
incentive power is negatively related to the landlord’s working capital, positively
related to the tenant’s working capital, and not signi…cantly related to the tenant’s
wealth. The authors conclude that …nancial constraints are more important than
risk aversion in explaining the design of tenancy contracts.
16Ackerberg and Botticini, J.P.E., 2002
The possibility of endogenous matching between landlords’ and tenants’ unob-
servable characteristics is studied in this paper, by means of a historical data set
from Renaissance Tuscany. Endogenous matching happens when there are reasons
leading principals and agents to contract with each other. For instance, if tenants
were heterogeneous in their level of risk aversion and plots di¤ered in their level
of riskiness, it could possibly be the case that less risk-averse tenants match with
more risky plots. Sincethe rule governing thematches isunknown, using proxies for
tenants’ risk aversion and plots’ risk is not enough to account for the endogeneity
bias.
The paper uses geographical-based instruments to account for the endogeneity
bias. The underlying assumption is that exogenous di¤erences across regions a¤ects
the matching between risk and risk aversion, without a¤ecting the contract design
through other channels. Once this matching is taken into account, the authors …nd
a positivecorrelation between thecontract shareand the tenant’swealth. Assuming
that wealth is a proxy for risk aversion, this evidence supports insurance motives
for share contracts.
Dubois, J.D.E., 2002
This paper develops a dynamic principal-agent model for agricultural tenancy
where the optimal incentive power balances e¤ort incentives, concerns about land-
quality maintenance, andrisk sharing. In themodel, landfertility isnon-contractible
and evolves over time. Moreover, contracts expire at the end of each season and
long-term contracts are not enforceable.
The author derives testable predictions that relate contract choice and land
value in environments where production e¤ort can reduce land fertility due to land
overuse. Theanalysis is implemented using data from rural areas of thePhillipines,
collected by theInternational Food Policy Research Institute (Washington) and the
Research Institute for Mindanao Culture (Xavier University, Phillipines).
Results reject the pure risk sharing model and the pure transaction costs ap-
proach. The trade-o¤ between productivity and land fertility is supported by the
data. Non-parametric estimation shows that the probability of leasing out a plot is
inverseU-shaped with respect to theland’s value. Among theleased plots, landlords
choose more incentive-powered contracts for more valuable plots and for cropping
patterns that are less likely to induce land overuse.
Bandiera, Mimeo, 2001
This article studies how crop characteristics a¤ect the design of tenancy con-
tracts, by using a historical data set collectedbetween 1870 and 1980 in the province
of Syracuse, Sicily. The empirical results indicate that: (i) the likelihood of share
17contracts is positively related to poor tenants and to crops whose productivity is
sensitive to e¤ort (such as vines and citrus trees); (ii) the most maintenance in-
tensive crops (such as vines and citrus trees) tend to be leased under long-term
contracts; (iii) there is a positive correlation between the contract length and the
tenant’s wealth for plots with low maintenance needs (such as wheat), and such
a relation is non-signi…cant for plots with high maintenance needs (such as vines,
citrus, and other fruit tress).
Pandey, Mimeo, 2001
The e¤ects of technology on the design of share contracts is studied through a
database collected by the author in 1996 and 1998 in four villages of North India.
The sample contains plot-level data on output and inputs of 270 randomly selected
plots cultivated under sharecropping and ownership. The design of share contracts
varies across villages in terms of the share of the output received by the tenant, the
share of costs borne by them, and the frequency that contracts are repeated.
The author constructs di¤erent measures of noise, based on the standard devi-
ation of the error term in a linear regression of output on di¤erent regressors (such
as plot characteristics and dummy variables for the tenancy contract, year, village,
and crop). Risk aversion is proxied by the tenant’s castle. The author …nds that
the probability of having a share contract repeated is negatively related to the out-
put noise. Moreover, sharecroppers’ rewards are lower powered when the output is
noisier.
Braido, Mimeo, 2003b
Two ofthemain di¢culties in testing therelationship between risk and incentive
power are that: (i) measures of risk based on output variability are a¤ected by the
farmer’s actions, and (ii) risk aversion is heterogeneous across farmers. Braido
(2003b) uses data from the ICRISAT’s Village Level Studies, in India, to address
these issues.
Exogenous risk is measured by the variability of the error term of a stochastic
Cobb-Douglas production function. This measure of risk controls for variability
caused by endogenously chosen inputs, cropping pattern, irrigation, etc. Moreover,
risk-aversion heterogeneity is taken into account by means ofa subsampleof farmers
who simultaneously own and sharecrop di¤erent plots (mixed tenants). Since in
this subsample each household cultivates lands under di¤erent contracts, thedesign
of these contracts must be related to characteristics of the land (such as risk),
instead ofcharacteristicsof thehousehold. Theevidence indicatesa positiverelation
between exogenous risk andincentivepower, which doesnot support therisk-sharing
argument for sharecropping.
183 Final Remarks and Policy Implications
The insurance theory have lately received innumerous theoretical contributions,
and the predictions of these theories have been tested against data from many
di¤erent markets. Sharecropping is regarded as a classic example of insurance, and
the empirical research in this area is mainly focused on moral hazard problems
(as opposed to adverse selection issues that are usually studied in other insurance
markets). In this essay, I discuss some papers that estimate the impact of di¤erent
contracts on resource allocation and others testing among di¤erent theories used to
explain the design of land-leasing contracts. This …nal section is intended to brie‡y
comment on some policy implications derived from these papers.
There is a relative consensus among economists that better-de…ned property
rights encourage investment decisions. The studies discussed in Section 1.1 suggest
that land investments made by tenants are a¤ected by tenure uncertainty. The
paper by Besley (1985) shows that fear ofexpropriation would also a¤ect landowners
willingness to make land improvements. In terms ofpolicy implications, it is widely
believed that a reliablelegal system (able to enforcecontracts and to de…neproperty
rights unambiguously) should positively impact land-leasing e¢ciency. Besidesthis,
better-de…ned rights could also reduce the amount of non-utilized lands. In some
developing countries, landholding is used as a store of value because public bonds
and local currency are not always reliable mechanisms. Fearing land reforms, some
of these investors prefer to keep the land unproductive instead of leasing it out to
a tenant (see Berry and Cline, 1979, and Assunção, 2002). Therefore, improving
the legal system to expand the set of feasible contracts can lead societies to more
e¢cient allocations.
Section1.2 discusseswhetherthelowerincentivepowerofsharecontractsdistorts
the allocation of input resources. The evidence presented by most of the literature
suggests share contracts induce lower productivity, but considering the arguments
in Braido (2003a), one can still have doubts on this issue. This debate, however,
generates no particular policy implication. Even if share contracts did induce lower
productivity, they could still be desirablefor solving thetrade-o¤between incentives
and risk sharing (seeStiglitz, 1974) or for alleviating soil exploitation (see Allen and
Lueck, 1992 and 1993). A di¤erent conclusion would follow if share contracts were
determined by other market imperfections, as analyzed in Section 2.
Thediscussion onthedeterminantsoftenancy contractsispresented inSection 2.
Many authors suggest that contract designsaredeterminedby market imperfections,
such as transaction costs (e.g., Allen and Lueck, 1992 and 1993) and credit-market
imperfections (e.g., La¤ont and Matoussi, 1995). In these cases, policies reducing
transaction cost and promoting the development of capital markets are desirable.
Insurance markets improve the allocation of risk without ignoring e¤ort incen-
19tives. In the past, microeconomic ine¢ciencies have been neglected in the debate
on public policy. Harberger (1954) estimates that distortions associated with mo-
nopolistic behavior in U.S. industry would amount to approximately 0.1 percent of
the U.S. GNP. A subsequent work, Harberger (1959), shows that this value would
amount to about 15% of the GNP in the Chilean economy. Recently, the growth
theory has suggested that di¤erences in the total factor productivity account for
most of the income inequality across countries (see Parente and Prescott, 2000).
Microeconomic distortions, such as trade barriers, rent seeking, market power, and
informational asymmetries are among the variables a¤ecting a country’s productiv-
ity. Therefore, applied research about asymmetricinformation in insurance markets
belongs to a broad agenda on the …eld of economic development and has important
welfare implications.
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